

**People Endorse Harsher Policies in Principle Than in Practice:  
Asymmetric Beliefs About Which Errors to Prevent Versus Fix**

*Word Count (Introduction/Discussion/Footnotes): 2,000/2,000*

**Author Note**

We have no known conflict of interest to disclose.

### Abstract

Countless policies are crafted with the intention of punishing *all* who do wrong or rewarding *only* those who do right. However, this requires accommodating certain mistakes: some who do not deserve to be punished might be, and some who deserve to be rewarded might not be. Six preregistered experiments ( $N = 3,484$  U.S. participants) reveal that people are more willing to accept this trade-off in principle, before errors occur, than in practice, after errors occur. The result is an asymmetry such that for punishments, people believe it is more important to *prevent* false negatives (e.g., criminals escaping justice) than to *fix* them, and more important to *fix* false positives (e.g., wrongful convictions) than to *prevent* them. For rewards, people believe it is more important to *prevent* false positives (e.g., welfare fraud) than to *fix* them, and more important to *fix* false negatives (e.g., improperly denied benefits) than to *prevent* them.

*Word Count:* 150/150

*Keywords:* Fairness, Moral Judgment, Judgment and Decision Making, Past vs. Future, Public Policy, Punishments and Rewards

### **Statement of Relevance**

Administering punishments and rewards inevitably requires resolving trade-offs between different types of errors, and there is often considerable debate about which are the most problematic. For example, some promote aggressive law enforcement tactics out of concern for false negatives (e.g., “tough-on-crime”), while others seek exoneration of the wrongfully convicted out of concern for false positives (e.g., The Innocence Project). This research develops a generalizable framework for understanding these beliefs. Specifically, we find that people are concerned with different errors when evaluating proposed policies (i.e., considering errors to prevent) than when evaluating existing policies (i.e., considering errors to fix), depending on whether they pertain to punishments or rewards. As such, framing a policy one way or another (e.g., describing affirmative action as rewarding the under-represented or punishing the over-represented) can similarly shift preferences. This research accordingly provides a novel theoretical lens for understanding real-world phenomena spanning political, managerial, and marketing contexts.

*Word Count:* 150/150

## Introduction

Governments, firms, and countless other institutions frequently use various types of punishment and reward policies. However, no policy is perfect. Sometimes, those who deserve to be punished or rewarded are not (false negatives); other times, those who do not deserve to be punished or rewarded are (false positives). Which errors do people believe are worse, when, and why?

In this research, we develop a generalizable framework describing preferences regarding these errors (Table 1). Specifically, we find that preferences to address false positives versus false negatives vary along two dimensions: (a) whether errors are considered before or after they occur and (b) whether they pertain to punishments or rewards.

For example, suppose an insurance company decides to increase the premiums charged to unsafe drivers—a punishment. Two types of mistakes are possible: some safe drivers might have their premiums raised (false positives), while some unsafe drivers might not (false negatives). We find that people believe it is more important to *prevent* false negatives than to fix them, and more important to *fix* false positives than to prevent them.

For rewards, the opposite pattern holds. For example, suppose instead that the same insurance company decides to reduce the premiums charged to safe drivers—a reward. Some unsafe drivers might have their premiums reduced (false positives), while some safe drivers might not (false negatives). Here, we find that people believe it is more important to *prevent* false positives than to fix them, and more important to *fix* false negatives than to prevent them.

**Table 1***An Asymmetry Between the Types of Errors People Prefer to Prevent Versus Fix*

| <b>Punishments</b> |  |                   |  |   |
|--------------------|--|-------------------|--|---|
| <b>Error Type</b>  | <b>Prevent</b>   | <b>Preference</b> | <b>Fix</b>   | <b>Example</b>  |
| False Positives    | Those who do not deserve to be punished will be punished | <                 | Those who did not deserve to be punished were punished | More important to fix wrongful convictions than to prevent these mistakes from happening in the first place       |
| False Negatives    | Those who deserve to be punished will not be punished    | >                 | Those who deserved to be punished were not punished    | More important to prevent criminals from escaping justice than to fix these mistakes after the fact               |
| <b>Rewards</b>     |  |                   |  |   |
| <b>Error Type</b>  | <b>Prevent</b>   | <b>Preference</b> | <b>Fix</b>   | <b>Example</b>  |
| False Positives    | Those who do not deserve to be rewarded will be rewarded | >                 | Those who did not deserve to be rewarded were rewarded | More important to prevent welfare fraud than to fix these mistakes after the fact                                 |
| False Negatives    | Those who deserve to be rewarded will not be rewarded    | <                 | Those who deserved to be rewarded were not rewarded    | More important to fix improperly denied benefits than to prevent these mistakes from happening in the first place |

To help explain these patterns, we first note that for punishments and rewards alike, false positives and false negatives can either harm “good actors” (e.g., those who do not deserve to be punished, but are, and those who deserve to be rewarded, but are not) or help “bad actors” (e.g., those who deserve to be punished, but are not, and those who do not deserve to be rewarded, but are). This common denominator matters, because we expect people to naturally relate more to “good actors” harmed than to “bad actors” helped (Chambers & Davis, 2012; Sedikides et al., 2003). In other words, people can more easily imagine themselves as someone who does not deserve to be punished or deserves to be rewarded (as opposed to someone who deserves to be punished or does not deserve to be rewarded). As such, we propose that “good actors” harmed will be relatively more vivid than “bad actors” helped.

Second, judgments about errors to prevent versus fix can be conceptualized as judgments about the future versus past. Critically, past outcomes are more accessible and concrete than future outcomes (Caruso et al., 2008; Kane et al., 2012; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Van Boven & Ashworth, 2007). Therefore, we additionally propose that when errors have *already* occurred (i.e., when considering errors to fix), there will be larger differences in vividness between “good actors” and “bad actors” relative to when errors have *not yet* occurred (i.e., when considering errors to prevent). Even if the latter outcomes are certain, they are less accessible and concrete, because they are unrealized (Small & Loewenstein, 2005).

To illustrate, consider again that for punishments (e.g., increasing premiums charged to unsafe drivers), two types of errors are possible: those who deserve to be punished might not be (false negatives) and those who do not deserve to be punished might be (false positives). After these errors occur, people can more easily imagine themselves as a safe driver who had their rates raised by mistake (i.e., a “good actor”) than as an unsafe driver who did not (i.e., a “bad actor”). Similarly, for rewards (e.g., reducing premiums for safe drivers), two types of errors are possible: those who deserve to be rewarded might not be (false negatives) and those who do not deserve to be rewarded might be (false positives). After these errors occur, people can more easily imagine themselves as a safe driver who did not have their rates reduced by mistake (i.e., a “good actor”) than as an unsafe driver who did (i.e., a “bad actor”). However, in both cases, before these errors occur, these same unrealized outcomes are less vivid.

Altogether, the hypothesized differences in vividness lead us to predict that the most concerning types of errors will be those that *both* (a) harm “good actors” and (b) have already happened. Indeed, we find that people maintain stronger preferences for *fixing* false-positive punishments than for preventing them and stronger preferences for *fixing* false-negative rewards

than for preventing them. The overall effect is endorsement of harsher policies in principle (before errors occur), when people focus relatively more on preventing mistakes that help “bad actors,” than in practice (after errors occur), when people focus relatively more on fixing mistakes that harm “good actors.”

We report 14 preregistered experiments (six in the main text; eight in the Web Appendix; total  $N = 7,278$ ; Table 2). All sample sizes were set *a priori* and sufficient to detect a small interaction ( $f^2 = 0.06$ ) with 80% power.<sup>1</sup> We disclose all measures, manipulations, and exclusions. Preregistrations, data, and stimuli are available:

[https://osf.io/69rjm/?view\\_only=191e1ff2e5db4ddb8472ade02855924b](https://osf.io/69rjm/?view_only=191e1ff2e5db4ddb8472ade02855924b).

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<sup>1</sup> A pilot study revealed a small interaction ( $f^2 = 0.06$ , 95% CI = [0.02, 0.12]), and a subsequent power analysis suggested that this would require at least 47 participants/cell to detect. We therefore conservatively targeted a sample size of at least 50 participants/cell across experiments.

**Table 2***Overview of Experiments*

| Exp. | N   | Purpose                                | AsPredicted              | Main Finding  | Proportion Addressing<br>False Negatives<br>(N Per Cell) |                   |                   |                   | Sig. |
|------|-----|--|--------------------------|---|--|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------|
|      |     |  |                          |   | Punishments  |                   | Rewards           |                   |      |
|      |     |  |                          |   | Prevent  | Fix               | Prevent           | Fix               |      |
| 1    | 296 | Basic effect<br>(generic stimuli)      | #130889                  | Participants were more likely to fix false-positive punishments than to prevent them and more likely to fix false-negative rewards than to prevent them.  | 0.60<br>(N = 72)   | 0.29<br>(N = 78)  | 0.54<br>(N = 74)  | 0.82<br>(N = 72)  | ***  |
| 2    | 917 | Basic effect<br>(naturalistic stimuli) | #79213                   | Conceptual replication across different scenarios: (a) a firm that docked pay/issued bonuses for poor/good performance, (b) an auto insurer that raised/reduced premiums for unsafe/safe driving, and (c) a municipality that assessed tax penalties/issued tax credits for wasting/conserving water.   | 0.53<br>(N = 234)  | 0.13<br>(N = 221) | 0.43<br>(N = 218) | 0.86<br>(N = 244) | ***  |
| 3    | 983 | Basic effect<br>(framing)              | #111192                  | Merely <i>framing</i> a policy (e.g., affirmative action) as a punishment or a reward shifted beliefs about which types of errors to prevent and fix.   | 0.25<br>(N = 249)  | 0.14<br>(N = 241) | 0.60<br>(N = 240) | 0.72<br>(N = 253) | ***  |
| 4    | 565 | Mediation                              | #98171                   | “Good actors” (i.e., those who do not deserve to be punished, but are, and those who deserve to be rewarded, but are not) were relatively more vivid than “bad actors” (i.e., those who deserve to be punished, but are not, and those who do not deserve to be rewarded, but are) when fixing versus preventing errors, and these perceptions statistically mediated the effect. | 0.50<br>(N = 125)  | 0.09<br>(N = 160) | 0.48<br>(N = 149) | 0.89<br>(N = 131) | ***  |
| 5A–B | 723 | Boundary<br>condition                  | #93609 (A)<br>#93459 (B) | The effect attenuated when a program was designed to measure water use, yielding false positives and false negatives, but no “good actors” and “bad actors,” as opposed to when a program was designed to <i>motivate</i> reduced water use (via punishments or rewards).   | 0.55<br>(N = 82)   | 0.14<br>(N = 102) | 0.57<br>(N = 103) | 0.83<br>(N = 76)  | ***  |

Note: \*\*\* $p < .001$ . Ns per cell for Experiments 5A–B exclude the no motivation conditions.



## Experiment 1

### Method

#### *Participants*

We recruited 300 participants from the behavioral laboratory at a public university in the United States. We excluded participants who did not complete the survey in its entirety, yielding a final sample of  $N = 296$  (age:  $M = 22.60$ ,  $SD = 5.29$ ; gender: 73% female, 25% male, 2% nonbinary).

#### *Procedure*

Experiment 1 employed a 2 (policy: punishment vs. reward)  $\times$  2 (frame: prevent vs. fix) between-subjects design.

For the punishment policy, participants read one of the following prompts:

- (1) **Punishments-Prevent:** “A policy is being designed to punish people. It will result in two mistakes. Only one of these mistakes can be prevented.”
- (2) **Punishments-Fix:** “A policy was designed to punish people. It resulted in two mistakes. Only one of these mistakes can be fixed.”

We then asked: “Which mistake should be [prevented/fixed]?” Participants selected between: “10 individuals [will be/were] punished, but they [will not deserve it/did not deserve to be]” (false positives) and “10 individuals [will deserve/deserved] to be punished, but they [will not be/were not]” (false negatives).

For the reward policy, participants read one of the following prompts:

- (3) **Rewards-Prevent:** “A policy is being designed to reward people. It will result in two mistakes. Only one of these mistakes can be prevented.”

**(4) Rewards-Fix:** “A policy was designed to reward people. It resulted in two mistakes.

Only one of these mistakes can be fixed.”

We then asked: “Which mistake should be [prevented/fixed]?” Participants selected between:

“10 individuals [will be/were] rewarded, but they [will not deserve it/did not deserve to be]”

(false positives) and “10 individuals [will deserve/deserved] to be rewarded, but they [will not be/were not]” (false negatives).

The prevent and fix frames were thus identical across the punishment and reward policies save for references to “punish” or “punished” and “reward” or “rewarded,” respectively. There were no other differences across conditions. We counterbalanced the order of all choices.

## Results

We coded false-negative choices as one and false-positive choices as zero, and we contrast-coded both policy (–1 for punishments; +1 for rewards) and frame (–1 for prevent; +1 for fix).


A logistic regression revealed a two-way policy-frame interaction ( $b = 0.65$ , 95% CI = [0.40, 0.91],  $z = 5.06$ ,  $p < .001$ , odds ratio = 1.92, 95% CI = [1.50, 2.49]; Figure 1). Among those evaluating the punishment policy, a larger proportion elected to *prevent* false negatives (0.60, 95% CI = [0.48, 0.71]) than to *fix* them (0.29, 95% CI = [0.19, 0.40];  $b = -0.63$ , 95% CI = [-0.97, -0.29],  $z = -3.66$ ,  $p < .001$ , odds ratio = 0.53, 95% CI = [0.38, 0.75]). Among those evaluating the reward policy, a larger proportion elected to *fix* false negatives (0.82, 95% CI = [0.73, 0.91]) than to *prevent* them (0.54, 95% CI = [0.43, 0.65];  $b = 0.68$ , 95% CI = [0.30, 1.05],  $z = 3.51$ ,  $p < .001$ , odds ratio = 1.96, 95% CI = [1.35, 2.86]).

## Discussion

Experiment 1 revealed the predicted asymmetry.<sup>2</sup> Experiment 2 tests more naturalistic scenarios.

### Figure 1

*Experiment 1 Results. For punishments, participants believed it was more important to prevent false negatives than to fix them, and more important to fix false positives than to prevent them; for rewards, participants believed it was more important to prevent false positives than to fix them, and more important to fix false negatives than to prevent them (Numbers above each bar correspond to the stimuli outlined in the procedure; error bars represent 95% confidence intervals)*



<sup>2</sup> In a supplemental experiment that was otherwise identical to Experiment 1, we replicated this asymmetry when treating frame as a within-subjects factor (i.e., participants indicated which errors to *both* prevent and fix; Supplemental Experiment 1, Web Appendix).

## Experiment 2

### Method

#### *Participants*

We opened an Amazon Mechanical Turk Human Intelligence Task (MTurk HIT) for 1,000 participants. We excluded participants who failed a preregistered attention check, yielding a final sample of  $N = 917$  (age:  $M = 42.25$ ,  $SD = 12.94$ ; gender: 56% female, 44% male, 1% nonbinary).

#### *Procedure*

Experiment 2 employed a 2 (policy: punishment vs. reward; between-subjects)  $\times$  2 (frame: prevent vs. fix; between-subjects)  $\times$  3 (scenario: pay vs. insurance vs. taxes; within-subjects) mixed design. We tested multiple scenarios to bolster generalizability but did not predict any systematic differences across them.

Each participant responded to three scenarios on three separate pages (Tables 3–4). For the punishment policy, the first scenario (pay) described docking pay for poor work performance, the second scenario (insurance) described assessing surcharges for unsafe driving, and the third scenario (taxes) described levying fines for using too much water during a drought. For the reward policy, the first scenario (pay) described issuing bonuses for good work performance, the second scenario (insurance) described the provision of discounts for safe driving, and the third scenario (taxes) described the issuance of tax credits for conserving water during a drought. As in Experiment 1, we described false positives and false negatives, and participants indicated which type of error should be prevented or fixed. We counterbalanced the order of all choices.

**Table 3***Experiment 2 Stimuli*

| Scenario  | Punishments  |   | Rewards   |  |
|-----------|--|---|---|--|
|           | Prevent  | Fix   | Prevent   | Fix  |
| Pay       | XYZ Inc. is planning to dock the pay of 100 salespeople by \$500 as a penalty for their low performance.   | XYZ Inc. docked the pay of 100 salespeople by \$500 as a penalty for their low performance.   | XYZ Inc. is planning to award 100 salespeople a bonus payment of \$500 in recognition of their high performance.  | XYZ Inc. awarded 100 salespeople a bonus payment of \$500 in recognition of their high performance.  |
| Insurance | ABC Auto Insurance Co. is conducting an audit of their policyholders and plans to increase monthly premium payments by \$50 for 100 of their policyholders who are deemed to be the most reckless drivers.   | ABC Auto Insurance Co. conducted an audit of their policyholders and decided to increase monthly premium payments by \$50 for 100 of their policyholders who were deemed to be the most reckless drivers.   | ABC Auto Insurance Co. is conducting an audit of their policyholders and plans to reduce monthly premium payments by \$50 for 100 of their policyholders who are deemed to be the safest drivers.   | ABC Auto Insurance Co. conducted an audit of their policyholders and decided to reduce monthly premium payments by \$50 for 100 of their policyholders who were deemed to be the safest drivers.   |
| Taxes     | Smallville is experiencing a drought, and as a result each household is being given an allotment for how much water they can consume over the course of a year. Annual bills will soon be computed, and the city's Superintendent of Water plans to assess a fine of \$250 upon 100 residents who go too far over their allotment. | Smallville is experiencing a drought, and as a result each household was given an allotment for how much water they could consume over the course of a year. Annual bills were recently computed, and the city's Superintendent of Water assessed a fine of \$250 upon 100 residents who went too far over their allotment. | Smallville is experiencing a drought, and as a result each household is being given an allotment for how much water they can consume over the course of a year. Annual bills will soon be computed, and the city's Superintendent of Water plans to award a credit of \$250 to 100 residents who remain sufficiently below their allotment. | Smallville is experiencing a drought, and as a result each household was given an allotment for how much water they could consume over the course of a year. Annual bills were recently computed, and the city's Superintendent of Water awarded a credit of \$250 to 100 residents who remained sufficiently below their allotment. |

**Table 4**

*Experiment 2 Choices (“FP” refers to false positives; “FN” refers to false negatives. Designations were not shown to participants)*

| Scenario  | Punishments  |   | Rewards  |   |
|-----------|--|---|--|---|
|           | Prevent  | Fix   | Prevent  | Fix   |
| Pay       | 10 of the 100 employees whose pay will be docked will not deserve it (that is, they <i>will not</i> in fact be low performers) [FP]<br>10 additional employees will deserve to have their pay docked (that is, they <i>will</i> in fact be low performers) but will not [FN]                             | 10 of the 100 employees whose pay was docked did not deserve it (that is, they <i>were not</i> in fact low performers) [FP]<br>10 additional employees deserved to have their pay docked (that is, they <i>were</i> in fact low performers) but did not [FN]                                      | 10 of the 100 employees who will receive a bonus will not deserve it (that is, they <i>will not</i> in fact be high performers) [FP]<br>10 additional employees will deserve a bonus (that is, they <i>will</i> in fact be high performers) but will not receive it [FN]                                     | 10 of the 100 employees who received a bonus did not deserve it (that is, they <i>were not</i> in fact high performers) [FP]<br>10 additional employees deserved a bonus (that is, they were in fact high performers) but did not receive it [FN]                                       |
| Insurance | 10 of the 100 policyholders whose premiums will be increased will not deserve it (that is, they <i>will not</i> in fact be reckless drivers) [FP]<br>10 additional policyholders will deserve to have their premiums increased (that is, they <i>will</i> in fact be reckless drivers) but will not [FN] | 10 of the 100 policyholders whose premiums were increased did not deserve it (that is, they <i>were not</i> in fact reckless drivers) [FP]<br>10 additional policyholders deserved an increase in their premiums (that is, they <i>were</i> in fact reckless drivers) but did not receive it [FN] | 10 of the 100 policyholders whose premiums will be reduced will not deserve it (that is, they <i>will not</i> in fact be safe drivers) [FP]<br>10 additional policyholders will deserve a reduction in their premiums (that is, they <i>will</i> in fact be safe drivers) but will not receive it [FN]       | 10 of the 100 policyholders whose premiums were reduced did not deserve it (that is, they <i>were not</i> in fact safe drivers) [FP]<br>10 additional policyholders deserved a reduction in their premiums (that is, they <i>were</i> in fact safe drivers) but did not receive it [FN] |
| Taxes     | 10 of the 100 residents who will be fined will not deserve it (that is, they <i>will not</i> have in fact gone over their allotment) [FP]<br>10 additional residents will deserve to be fined (that is, they <i>will</i> have in fact gone over their allotment) but will not be [FN]                    | 10 of the 100 residents who were fined did not deserve it (that is, they <i>did not</i> in fact go over their allotment) [FP]<br>10 additional residents deserved to be fined (that is, they <i>did</i> in fact go over their allotment) but were not [FN]  | 10 of the 100 residents who will receive a credit will not deserve it (that is, they <i>will not</i> have in fact remained below their allotment) [FP]<br>10 additional residents will deserve to receive a credit (that is, they <i>will</i> have in fact remained below their allotment) but will not [FN] | 10 of the 100 residents who received a credit did not deserve it (that is, they <i>did not</i> in fact remain below their allotment) [FP]<br>10 additional residents deserved to receive a credit (that is, they <i>did</i> in fact remain below their allotment) but did not [FN]      |

## Results

We coded false-negative choices as one and false-positive choices as zero, and we contrast-coded both policy (−1 for punishments; +1 for rewards) and frame (−1 for prevent; +1 for fix). We then took the mean of each participants' choices across the three within-subjects scenarios. Note that this analysis deviated from our preregistration, which called for a mixed model. However, because all simple effects and two-way policy-frame interactions were significant and consistent with our predictions, we elected to present this simpler analysis (i.e., collapsing our results over scenario).


An OLS regression revealed a two-way policy-frame interaction ( $b = 0.21$ , 95% CI = [0.19, 0.23],  $t(913) = 18.42$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $f^2 = 0.37$ , 95% CI = [0.29, 0.46]; Figure 2). For those evaluating punishment policies, a larger proportion of participants elected to *prevent* false negatives (0.53, 95% CI = [0.48, 0.59]) than to *fix* them (0.13, 95% CI = [0.10, 0.12];  $b = -0.20$ , 95% CI = [-0.23, -0.17],  $t(453) = -12.50$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.17$ , 95% CI = [0.97, 1.37]). For those evaluating reward policies, a larger proportion of participants elected to *fix* false negatives (0.86, 95% CI = [0.82, 0.90]) than to *prevent* them (0.43, 95% CI = [0.37, 0.42];  $b = 0.22$ , 95% CI = [0.19, 0.25],  $t(460) = 13.55$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = -1.26$ , 95% CI = [1.06, 1.46]).

## Discussion

Experiment 2 conceptually replicated Experiment 1 with richer stimuli, bolstering generalizability. In Experiment 3, we tested whether merely *framing* a policy as a punishment or reward similarly shifts beliefs.

**Figure 2**

*Experiment 2 Results. Across managerial (pay), consumer (insurance), and policy (taxes) contexts, for punishments, participants believed it was more important to prevent false negatives than to fix them, and more important to fix false positives than to prevent them; for rewards, participants believed it was more important to prevent false positives than to fix them, and more important to fix false negatives than to prevent them (Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals)*

**Experiment 3**

We described affirmative action as either rewarding the under-represented or punishing the over-represented. Past research has similarly framed these policies as either helping minority or harming majority individuals and groups (Crosby et al., 2003; Lowery et al., 2006; Munguia Gomez & Levine, 2022).



## **Method**

### ***Participants***

We requested 1,000 participants on Prolific Academic. We excluded participants who failed a preregistered attention check, yielding a final sample of  $N = 983$  (age:  $M = 39.76$ ,  $SD = 14.18$ ; gender: 50% female, 48% male, 1% nonbinary).

### ***Procedure***

Experiment 3 employed a 2 (policy: punishment vs. reward)  $\times$  2 (frame: prevent vs. fix) between-subjects design.

For the punishment policy, participants read: “An organization [is planning to implement/has implemented] an affirmative action policy to punish people from over-represented backgrounds. However, this policy [will result/has resulted] in two types of mistakes.” We then asked: “Which mistake should be [prevented/fixed]?” Participants selected between false negatives (“Some people from over-represented backgrounds [will not be/were not] punished (even though they [will deserve/deserved] to be punished”) and false positives (“Some people from under-represented backgrounds [will be/were] punished (even though they [will not/did not] deserve to be punished”).

For the reward policy, participants read: “An organization [is planning to implement/has implemented] an affirmative action policy to reward people from under-represented backgrounds. However, this policy [will result/has resulted] in two types of mistakes.” We then asked: “Which mistake should be [prevented/fixed]?” Participants selected between false negatives (“Some people from under-represented backgrounds [will not be/were not] rewarded (even though they [will deserve/deserved] to be rewarded”) and false positives (“Some people

from over-represented backgrounds [will be/were] rewarded (even though they [will not/did not] deserve to be rewarded”). We counterbalanced the order of all choices.

## Results

We coded false-negative choices as one and false-positive choices as zero, and we contrast-coded both policy (–1 for punishment; +1 for reward) and frame (–1 for prevent; +1 for fix).

A logistic regression revealed a two-way policy-frame interaction ( $b = 0.30$ , 95% CI = [0.15, 0.45],  $z = 3.95$ ,  $p < .001$ , odds ratio = 1.84, 95% CI = [1.16, 1.57]). When the affirmative action policy was described as a punishment, a larger proportion of participants elected to prevent false negatives (0.25, 95% CI = [0.20, 0.30]) than to fix them (0.14, 95% CI = [0.10, 0.19];  $b = -0.35$ , 95% CI = [-0.58, -0.12],  $z = -2.98$ ,  $p = .003$ , odds ratio = 0.70, 95% CI = [0.56, 0.89]). When the same policy was described as a reward, a larger proportion of participants elected to fix false negatives (0.72, 95% CI = [0.66, 0.77]) than to prevent them (0.60, 95% CI = [0.54, 0.67];  $b = 0.25$ , 95% CI = [0.06, 0.44],  $z = 2.60$ ,  $p = .009$ , odds ratio = 1.28, 95% CI = [1.06, 1.55]; Figure 3).

## Discussion


Experiments 1–3 offer convergent evidence for the basic effect.<sup>3</sup> We designed Experiment 4 to probe one potential mechanism: the relative vividness of “good actors” to “bad actors.”

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<sup>3</sup> In a second supplemental experiment, we elicited preferences via titration (as opposed to forced choice). The resulting “exchange rates” conceptually replicated Experiments 1–3 (Supplemental Experiment 2, Web Appendix).

**Figure 3**

*Experiment 3 Results. Framing affirmative action as either “rewarding” the under-represented or “punishing” the over-represented yielded asymmetric beliefs about which types of errors should be prevented versus fixed (Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals)*

**Experiment 4****Method****Participants**

We opened an MTurk HIT for 600 participants. We excluded participants who failed a preregistered attention check, yielding a final sample of  $N = 565$  (age:  $M = 42.35$ ,  $SD = 13.12$ ; gender: 50% female, 49% male, 1% nonbinary).

**Procedure**

Experiment 4 employed a 2 (policy: punishment vs. reward)  $\times$  2 (frame: prevent vs. fix) between-subjects design.

Participants reviewed the pay scenario from Experiment 2. After indicating which type of error to prevent or fix, participants rated, on a separate page, the vividness of those affected by each type of error using measures adapted from Keller & Block (1997). Specifically, we asked: “How vivid are these salespeople?”; “How personal are the stories of these salespeople?”; “How concrete do these salespeople feel?”; “How easy is it to imagine these salespeople?”; “How easy is it to relate to these salespeople?”; and “How easy is it to picture these salespeople?” (for each: “Not at all” = 1; “Extremely” = 7). We counterbalanced the order of all choices.

## Results

We coded false-negative choices as one and false-positive choices as zero, and we contrast-coded both policy (−1 for punishment; +1 for reward) and frame (−1 for prevent; +1 for fix).

A logistic regression revealed a two-way policy-frame interaction ( $b = 1.11$ , 95% CI = [0.89, 1.34],  $z = 9.64$ ,  $p < .001$ , odds ratio = 3.04, 95% CI = [2.44, 3.83]), directly replicating Experiment 2. Among those evaluating the punishment policy, a larger proportion elected to prevent false negatives (0.50, 95% CI = [0.41, 0.58]) than to fix them (0.09, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.13];  $b = -1.16$ , 95% CI = [-1.49, -0.84],  $z = -7.01$ ,  $p < .001$ , odds ratio = 0.31, 95% CI = [0.23, 0.43]). Among those evaluating the reward policy, a larger proportion elected to fix false negatives (0.89, 95% CI = [0.83, 0.94%]) than to prevent them (0.48, 95% CI = [0.40, 0.56];  $b = 1.06$ , 95% CI = [0.74, 1.37],  $z = 6.61$ ,  $p < .001$ , odds ratio = 2.88, 95% CI = [2.10, 3.94]).

Next, for each participant and for each type of error, we computed absolute vividness scores by averaging all six scale items ( $\alpha = 0.93$ ). Then, to construct a *relative* vividness score, for each participant, we subtracted the absolute vividness score for the false positives from the absolute vividness score for the false negatives.

An OLS regression revealed a two-way policy-frame interaction ( $b = -0.14$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.23, -0.05]$ ,  $t(561) = -3.12$ ,  $p = 0.002$ ,  $f^2 = 0.02$ , 95% CI =  $[0.002, 0.050]$ ). For the punishment policy, false positives (i.e., the “good actors”—that is, the overperforming employees) were comparatively more vivid than false negatives (i.e., the “bad actors”—that is, the underperforming employees) in the fix frame ( $M = 0.76$ , 95% CI =  $[0.58, 0.93]$ ) than in the prevent frame ( $M = 0.46$ , 95% CI =  $[0.27, 0.64]$ ;  $b = 0.15$ , 95% CI =  $[0.02, 0.27]$ ,  $t(283) = 2.31$ ,  $p = 0.021$ ,  $d = 0.27$ , 95% CI =  $[0.03, 0.51]$ ). For the reward policy, false negatives (i.e., the “good actors”—that is, the overperforming employees) were comparatively more vivid than false positives (i.e., the “bad actors”—that is, the underperforming employees) in the fix frame ( $M = -0.95$ , 95% CI =  $[-1.12, -0.77]$ ) than in the prevent frame ( $M = -0.68$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.85, -0.51]$ ;  $b = -0.13$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.26, -0.01]$ ,  $t(278) = -2.10$ ,  $p = 0.036$ ,  $d = 0.26$ , 95% CI =  $[0.02, 0.50]$ ).

Finally, we tested whether relative vividness mediated the effect of frame on preferences to address false positives versus false negatives. We tested for mediation separately across the punishment and reward policies (with 10,000 bootstrapped samples for each), treating frame as the independent variable, choice as the dependent variable, and relative vividness as the mediator. For the punishment policy, choice was mediated by relative vividness (indirect effect:  $b = -0.008$ ,  $p = 0.026$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.0198, -0.0006]$ , proportion mediated = 0.05, 95% CI =  $[0.004, 0.127]$ ). Similarly, for the reward policy, choice was mediated by relative vividness (indirect effect:  $b = 0.007$ ,  $p = 0.042$ , 95% CI =  $[0.0002, 0.0187]$ , proportion mediated = 0.04, 95% CI =  $[0.001, 0.114]$ ). For the punishment and reward policies, sensitivity analyses (Imai et al., 2010) indicated that at  $\rho$ s of  $-0.21$  and  $-0.18$ , respectively, the average causal mediation effect was 0.00.

## Discussion

Although there are numerous well-documented limitations associated with the use of statistical mediation to collect psychological process evidence (e.g., Imai et al., 2010; Rohrer et al., 2022), the results of Experiment 4 offer initial, suggestive evidence for the potential role of relative vividness. We comment on additional possible processes in the General Discussion. Our final experiments test a boundary condition.

### Experiments 5A–B

If the relative vividness of “good actors” to “bad actors” helps explain, in part, different preferences for which errors to prevent versus fix, then describing policies that generate false positives and false negatives without yielding corresponding “good actors” or “bad actors” should attenuate the effect. We thus manipulated whether a program was intended to *motivate* reduced water use (via punishments and rewards) or simply measure it.

## Method

### *Participants*

Given that all simple effects of frame (e.g., prevent vs. fix) within the punishment and reward conditions in Experiments 1–4 were significant (and in opposite directions), we tested punishments and rewards separately in Experiments 5A–B to maximize statistical power. For Experiment 5A, we opened an MTurk HIT for 400 participants. We excluded participants who failed a preregistered attention check, yielding a final sample of  $N = 360$  (age:  $M = 40.77$ ,  $SD = 12.06$ ; gender: 55% female, 44% male, 1% nonbinary). For Experiment 5B, we opened an MTurk HIT for 400 workers. We excluded participants who failed a preregistered attention check, yielding a final sample of  $N = 363$  (age:  $M = 40.69$ ,  $SD = 14.04$ ; gender: 50% female, 50% male, 0% nonbinary).

*Procedure*

Experiments 5A–B both employed a 2 (frame: prevent vs. fix)  $\times$  2 (goal: motivation vs. no motivation) between-subjects design and adapted the taxes scenario from Experiment 2.

Experiment 5A tested punishments, Experiment 5B rewards. All participants in the motivation condition of each experiment first read: “Smallville [is experiencing/recently experienced] a drought, and as a result the local government [will be piloting/piloted] a program in which they [will test/tested] whether they [can/could] effectively encourage households to reduce their water use by collecting water usage information from “smart meters.” Smallville’s local government [plans to randomly select/randomly selected] 100 households to join the program based upon the last digit of their telephone number.”

In the motivation condition of Experiment 5A, participants learned that “at the end of [the coming year/the year], the government [will assess/assessed] a fine of \$500 upon any household which [increases/increased] their water use by 25% or more.” Participants then chose to prevent or fix either false negatives (“10 households [will deserve/deserved] to be fined \$500 but [will not be/were not]”) or false positives (“10 of the households that [will be/were] fined \$500 [will/did] not actually deserve it”). In the motivation condition of Experiment 5B, participants learned that “at the end of [the coming year/the year], the government [will issue/issued] a rebate of \$500 to any household which [reduces/reduced] their water use by 25% or more.” Participants then chose to prevent or fix either false negatives (“10 households [will deserve/deserved] to be issued a rebate of \$500 but [will not be/were not]”) or false positives (“10 of the households that [will be/were] issued a \$500 rebate [will/did] not actually deserve it”).

The no motivation conditions in Experiments 5A–B were identical. All participants first read: “Smallville [will be piloting/piloted] a program in which they [will test/tested] whether

they [can/could] effectively collect water usage information from “smart meters.” Smallville’s local government [plans to randomly select/randomly selected] 100 households to join the program based upon the last digit of their telephone number.” Participants then chose to prevent or fix either false negatives (“10 households should [be/have been] enrolled in the program but [will not be/were not]”) or false positives (“10 of the households that [will be/were] enrolled in the program should not [be/have been]”). We counterbalanced the order of all choices in Experiments 5A–B.

## Results

We coded false-negative choices as one and false-positive choices as zero, and we contrast-coded both frame ( $-1$  for prevent;  $+1$  for fix) and goal ( $-1$  for no motivation;  $+1$  for motivation).

For Experiment 5A, a logistic regression revealed a two-way frame-goal interaction ( $b = -0.60$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.84, -0.36]$ ,  $z = -4.91$ ,  $p < .001$ , odds ratio = 0.55, 95% CI =  $[0.43, 0.69]$ ; Figure 4). In the motivation condition, there was a simple effect of frame ( $b = -1.00$ , 95% CI =  $[-1.37, -0.62]$ ,  $z = -5.22$ ,  $p < .001$ , odds ratio = 0.37, 95% CI =  $[0.25, 0.54]$ ), conceptually replicating Experiment 2. Specifically, a larger proportion of participants elected to prevent false negatives (0.55, 95% CI =  $[0.46, 0.65]$ ) than to fix them (0.14, 95% CI =  $[0.07, 0.22]$ ). In the no motivation condition, there was no simple effect of frame ( $b = 0.20$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.10, 0.49]$ ,  $z = 1.32$ ,  $p = 0.187$ , odds ratio = 1.22, 95% CI =  $[0.91, 1.64]$ ).


For Experiment 5B, a logistic regression revealed a two-way frame-goal interaction ( $b = 0.22$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.01, -0.45]$ ,  $z = 1.89$ ,  $p = 0.06$ , odds ratio = 1.24, 95% CI =  $[0.99, 1.56]$ ; Figure 4). In the motivation condition, there was a simple effect of frame ( $b = 0.66$ , 95% CI =  $[0.32, 1.00]$ ,  $z = 3.79$ ,  $p < .001$ , odds ratio = 1.93, 95% CI =  $[1.37, 2.71]$ ), conceptually



replicating Experiment 2. Specifically, a larger proportion of participants elected to fix false negatives (0.83, 95% CI = [0.76, 0.91]) than to prevent them (0.57, 95% CI = [0.47, 0.68]). In the no motivation condition, there was no simple effect of frame ( $b = 0.22$ , 95% CI = [-0.08, 0.52],  $z = 1.43$ ,  $p = 0.152$ , odds ratio = 1.25, 95% CI = [0.92, 1.68]).

#### Figure 4

*Studies 5A–B Results. When a program intended to measure water use (as opposed to motivate reduced water use) yielded false positives and false negatives, but no “good actors” or “bad actors,” the effect attenuated (Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals)*



#### Discussion

Experiments 5A–B suggest that our account does not extend to any policy that generates false positives and false negatives, revealing an important boundary condition: absent “good actors” and “bad actors” who are erroneously harmed and helped, the effect is attenuated.

### General Discussion


When administering punishments and rewards, mistakes happen. Do some mistakes seem worse than others? This research finds that the answer depends not only on whether mistakes pertain to punishments or rewards, but whether they are evaluated before or after they occur.

It thus offers a novel theoretical backdrop for understanding many real-world policy debates. For example, in a series of supplemental studies, participants chose between unspecified numbers of each type of error in the context of 10 real-world punishment and reward policies (Supplemental Experiments 3–4, Web Appendix). Even in this less controlled setting, we observed patterns directionally consistent with our laboratory experiments (though not all differences were significant; Figures 5–6). These findings potentially suggest that at least some disagreement about these issues may relate to how (or when) they are evaluated.

Notably, across experiments, the asymmetry seems to have been largely driven by beliefs about which errors to fix. That is, all choice shares for fixing, but not for preventing, differed significantly from 50%. Though we do not make normative claims regarding whether these preferences constitute a “mistake,” people may indeed have stronger convictions about which errors to fix than to prevent. If so, public support might be higher for policies that hew closer to the preferences observed in the fix frames. Additionally, it is unclear whether people themselves view inconsistencies as problematic, given that we replicated these patterns when asking participants to indicate which errors to *both* prevent and fix (Supplemental Experiment 1, Web Appendix; Nielsen & Rehbeck, 2022).


**Figure 5**

*Supplemental Experiment 3. Real-World Policies—Punishments (Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals)*



**Figure 6**

*Supplemental Experiment 4. Real-World Policies—Rewards (Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals)*



Separately, false-positive and false-negative errors arise in numerous contexts, raising a natural question about generalizability. For example: the replication crisis fundamentally reflects a tension between the types of errors that the scientific enterprise has chosen to prevent versus fix (Ioannidis, 2005); medical testing requires calibrating tolerance for false-positive and false-negative results; markets that pick “winners” and “losers” sometimes err. While Experiments 5A–B imply that these beliefs may be context-dependent, an open question is whether they arise in other settings.

Several limitations warrant discussion and suggest other potential mechanisms. For example, inferences about the *certainty* of outcomes might have differed across our studies. We presented information unambiguously (e.g., “10 individuals will be punished, but they will not deserve it”) to cleanly test our predictions, but the future is inherently more uncertain than the past. Furthermore, we did not manipulate the reversibility or severity of errors, and often the most severe mistakes (i.e., those with the highest stakes) cannot be fixed (e.g., capital punishment). Severity might also shape the perceived or actual difficulty of addressing those mistakes. And relatedly, intuitions about base rates and preconceived notions of prevailing error rates might matter.

Another important caveat is that we exclusively recruited participants in the United States. There are well-documented issues with the generalizability of psychological phenomena beyond western cultures (Henrich et al., 2010; Thalmayer et al., 2021). Future work might therefore explore cross-cultural differences.

Moreover, because punishments and rewards can be reframed as losses and gains, respectively, a natural consideration is the potential role of prospect theory and the related concept of reference dependence (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, participants may

have hesitated to “claw back” false-positive rewards because doing so would have imposed losses on certain individuals. However, if participants were concerned about imposing losses, then in the context of punishments they should not have been less willing to prevent false positives than to fix them. Reference dependence thus seems limited in its ability to parsimoniously explain our results.

Overall, our framework builds upon and extends several theories. For example, research exploring the identifiable victim effect (Schelling, 1968) has similarly implicated vividness as one potential cause (Lee & Feely, 2016; Small, 2015; cf. Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997). Additionally, we document another critical context in which judgments about the past and future differ (e.g., Burns et al., 2012; Caruso, 2010; Cooney et al., 2016). Finally, given that the allocation of punishments and rewards can trigger concerns about fairness (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2006; Cappelen et al., 2023; Davidai & Tepper, 2023; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Shaddy & Shah, 2018), this work introduces another important consideration potentially shaping these perceptions.

### **Conclusion**

Sir William Blackstone famously posited that “it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer” (Blackstone, 1769). However, the present research suggests that this claim is incomplete. These preferences also depend on whether errors are considered before or after they occur, and whether they pertain to punishments or rewards. Our findings thus provide a framework for understanding seemingly inconsistent perceptions about public policies, and critical insights for policymakers, managers, and marketers (among others).

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